The Perfect Moral Commonwealth?

As I mentioned a while back, I managed to borrow a copy of Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire by Steven Collins. Unfortunately I've largely gotten busy/distracted with other things and haven't spent as much time reading as I had intended, and now I need to return it to the library.

I'm going to try to get something out of it before returning it, then let it sit in the library a while and check it out again in a few weeks perhaps to read for real this time. Hopefully I haven't deprived some needy student of the book in my negligence.

The part of the book I'm most interested in is Part 2: Paradise in Heaven and on Earth, in particular, Chapter 6: The perfect moral commonwealth? Kingship and it's discontents.

First off, the author is most concerned with what he calls the "Pali imaginaire" which is "a mental universe created by and within Pali texts." So he is, if I understand all this right, more concerned with the historical understanding and interpretation of the texts rather than the issue of "did the Buddha actually really say such-and-such."

The point when I got interested in this book was reading Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of SN 4.20: Rajja Sutta, where he recommends Collins' book for it's overview of this issue of whether it's possible to "rule righteously" or not. (His book was also recommended to me here.)

In fact, the very first substantial thing I posted was "Is it possible to exercise rulership... righteously?" which was about this Rajja Sutta. So now I'm basically coming back to the blog's very first post and investigating it further.

Collins starts out by mentioning that scholars have different points of view on how political the Buddha was; some say the Buddha was apolitical, others say he was a social and political theorist.

Probably the most important thing he mentions is that the texts seem to suggest two "modes" of Dhamma interpretation which he simply calls Mode 1 and Mode 2. (I am sort of quoting some of his words here but I hesitate to use quotes in all places because I'm paraphrasing some places and at least not checking for exactness in others.)

• Mode 1 is an "ethics of reciprocity" which I think of as being moral cause-and-effect (kamma) as implemented by humans. The assessment of violence is context-dependent and negotiable in this mode. Buddhist advice to kings in Mode 1 tells them not to pass judgment in haste or anger, but appropriate such that the punishment fits the crime. Following such advice means to be a "Good King" as he says. Justice is institutionalized Mode 1. Some phrases that typify this mode are "one good turns deserves another", "an eye for an eye...", "it's only fair", "if you do harm expect people to harm you back."


• Mode 2 is an ethic of absolute values in which the assessment of violence is context-independent and non-negotiable. Punishment, as a species of violence, is itself a crime. The only advice to kings in Mode 2 is "don't be one!" Renounce the world and leave everything to the law of kamma. Many stories recommend just this, others envisage the utopia of a nonviolent king. The universe ruthlessly enforces kamma and there can't be a good king because kings necessarily must do wrong according to mode 2 to administer justice.

Google books link to page talking about Mode 1 and Mode2. (Please tell me whether or not this link works for you since I'm unsure if it will.)

Much of what I can remember reading in the first four Nikayas of the Sutta Pitaka seem to assume Mode 2 for the most part. It's worth noting that the author cites the Saratthapakasini (commentary) claiming Mode 1 for the Rajja Sutta and thus it comes to the conclusion that it is in fact possible to rule righteously, though the Mode 2 analysis would appear to generally suggest otherwise.

The author first recounts the Muggapakha Jataka as evidence of how kings are fundamentally evil, regardless of how just they are, in the absolute Mode 2 sense.

In the Muggapakha (Dumb Criple) Jataka, also called the Temiya Jataka, the Buddha to-be is reborn as Temiya, son of a king. At a young age he noticed that his father rules justly, but even in accordance with justice he carries out punishments for criminals.

"Alas because he is a king my father is doing terrible things which will take him to hell." So Temiya, seeing the danger in being a king, essentially pretends to be mentally and physically disabled so that he won't become a king and wont't go to hell, as he had seen happen in his previous lives after he had lived as a king.

Eventually his act is found out and he is tempted by his father to become king using many promises of the usual wealth and sensual pleasures, but he refuses in order to pursue the life of an ascetic. "Criminals aspire to wealth, king" he says, which is interesting because the Buddha doesn't state this in suttas to householders such as the Sigalovada Sutta. (I'm not sure whether to think this is an outright contradiction or if things like the Sigalovada are supposed to have some sort of "Mode 1" interpretation.)

Anyway, in the strictest "Mode 2" sense being a king necessarily involves evil actions and is to be avoided.

The author points out that there is a certain range in which the five precepts are observed by different people depending on their position as laypeople or monks. For example, laypeople typically focus on avoiding grossly harmful actions such as killing, while monks are much stricter, avoiding talk of killing or even aggressive thoughts. Laypeople avoid harmful sex or false speech whereas monks avoid sex altogether, talk of sex, thoughts of sex, harsh speech, idle speech (speech not connected with Nibbana), etc.

So really there's a sort of range here. For the most part only monks try to have absolutely perfect virtue, laypeople try to have good virtue to varying degrees (typically constrained by social responsibilities), and kings, like other laypeople, tend to have worse virtue which is further constrained by greater and heavier social responsibilities such as punishment of criminals.

One might say that rulers "should" just not administer justice and let kamma take it's course, but as we can imagine this would lead to anarchy and chaos as long as the prerequisites for crime are present in society. "Natural" vs. "human induced" results of actions could take lifetimes to occur, too late to punish/condition/train people in and structure society in the here-and-now.

The only way to avoid having to punish people, as a king/ruler, is to somehow have the amazing wisdom (discernment) to address the root causes of crimes such that no crime ever happens and thus nobody ever needs to be punished! Somehow this does not seem likely to happen any time soon given current social conditions. Essentially anyone who could address the root causes of immorality in such an amazing utopian manner would be the fabled wheel-turning monarch.

Still though, I'm not sure if I agree with the author's assessment that this Mode 2 utopia is possible according to the Wheel-Turning Monarch legend, since the Buddha does describe the Wheel-Turning Monarch as having many sons who are "conquerers of the invading army" which suggests that he's likely to have to cause someone to be killed at some point. But who knows, maybe this legendary Buddha-like king could always find a way to discourage any possible aggressor without violence, no matter how bloodthirsty.

So I think I'll stop there. The main thing I take from this is that there are different "standards" if you will for sila (virtue) depending on one's situation. Without being an ascetic (monk) in an ideal situation (such as alone in the forest) it's impossible to have perfect sila without some sort of social responsibility or something interfering with it. As a layperson, the more responsibilities you have the more difficult situations you are placed in, and as you become a more a more powerful layperson (such a a local, regional, national, etc, ruler) sila becomes harder and harder to maintain.

To conclude this post I just want to say that so far this book is very interesting, and it has introduced me to some of the Jataka tales that I had not really looked into until now.